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Abstract—Forensic analyses of digital images rely heavily on the
traces of in-camera and out-camera processes left on the acquired
images. Such traces represent a sort of camera fingerprint. If
one is able to recover them, by suppressing the high-level scene
content and other disturbances, a number of forensic tasks
can be easily accomplished. A notable example is the PRNU
pattern, which can be regarded as a device fingerprint, and has
received great attention in multimedia forensics. In this paper
we propose a method to extract a camera model fingerprint,
called noiseprint, where the scene content is largely suppressed
and model-related artifacts are enhanced. This is obtained by
means of a Siamese network, which is trained with pairs of
image patches coming from the same (label +1) or different
(label −1) cameras. Although noiseprints can be used for a
large variety of forensic tasks, here we focus on image forgery
localization. Experiments on several datasets widespread in the
forensic community show noiseprint-based methods to provide
state-of-the-art performance.
Keywords—Digital image forensics, noise residual, siamese net-
works, deep learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, digital image forensics has been draw-
ing an ever increasing attention in the scientific community
and beyond. With cheap and powerful cameras available to
virtually anyone in the world, and the ubiquitous diffusion of
social networks, images and videos have become a dominant
source of information. Unfortunately, they are used not only
for innocent purposes, but more and more often to shape and
and distort people’s opinion for commercial, political or even
criminal aims. In this context, image and video manipulations
are becoming very common, and increasingly dangerous for
individuals and society as a whole.
Driven by these phenomena, in the last decade, a large
number of methods have been proposed for forgery detection
and localization or camera identification [1], [2], [3]. Some
of them rely on semantic or physical inconsistencies [4], [5],
but statistical methods, based on pixel-level analyses of the
data, are by far the most successful and widespread. Mostly,
they exploit the fact that any acquisition device leaves on each
captured image distinctive traces, much like a gun barrel leaves
peculiar striations on any bullet fired by it.
Statistical methods can follow both a model-based and a
data-driven approach. Methods of the first class try to build
mathematical models of some specific features and exploit
them for forensic purposes. Popular targets of such analyses
are lens aberration [6], [7], [8], camera response function [9],
[10], [11], color filter array (CFA) [12], [13], [14] or JPEG
artifacts [15], [16], [17], [18]. Having models to explain the
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Fig. 1. Two forged images (left) with their noiseprints (right). The inconsis-
tencies caused by the manipulation are visible in the extracted noiseprint.
available evidence has an obvious appeal, but also a number
of shortcomings, first of all their usually narrow scope of
application.
As an alternative, one can rely on data-driven methods,
where models are mostly abandoned, and the algorithms are
trained on a suitably large number of examples. Most data-
driven methods work on the so-called noise residual, that
is, the noise-like signal which remains once the high-level
semantic content has been removed. A noise residual can be
obtained by subtracting from the image its “clean” version
estimated by means of denoising algorithms, or by applying
some high-pass filters in the spatial or transform (Fourier,
DCT, wavelet) domain [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. Noise
residuals can be also used in a blind context (no external
training) to reveal local anomalies that indicate possible image
tampering [25], [26], [27], [28].
Among all methods based on noise residuals, those relying
on the photo-response non-uniformity noise (PRNU) deserve
a special attention for their popularity and performance. In the
seminal paper by Lukas et al. [30] it was observed that each
individual device leaves a specific mark on all acquired images,
the PRNU pattern, due to imperfections in the device manufac-
turing process. Because of its uniqueness, and stability in time,
the PRNU pattern can be regarded as a device fingerprint, and
used to carry out multiple forensic tasks. PRNU-based methods
have shown excellent performance for source identification
[31] and for image forgery detection and localization [30],
[32], [33], [34], [35]. Note that they can find any type of
forgeries, irrespective of their nature, since the lack of PRNU is
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2Fig. 2. From left to right: the forged image, its noiseprint, the noise residual obtained using a Wavelet-based denoising filter [29] (a tool commonly used for
PRNU extraction) and the noise residual obtained through a 3rd order derivative filter (used in the Splicebuster algorithm [28]).
seen as a possible clue of manipulation. The main drawbacks
of PRNU-based methods are i) the need of a large number
of images taken from the camera to obtain good estimates
and ii) the low power of the signal of interest with respect to
noise, which impacts heavily on the performance. In particular,
the prevailing source of noise is the high-level image content,
which leaks in the PRNU due to imperfect filtering. The latter
often overwhelms the information of interest, especially in the
presence of saturated, dark or textured areas. This latter is a
typical problem of all the methods based on noise residuals.
In this work, to overcome these problems we propose a
new method to extract a noise residual. Our explicit goal is
to improve the rejection of semantic content and, at the same
time, emphasize all the camera-related artifacts, since they bear
traces of the whole digital history of an image. While doing
this, we want to avoid any external dependency. Therefore, we
will rely neither on prior information of any type, nor on the
availability of a labelled set of training data.
To this end, we follow a data driven approach and exploit
deep learning. A suitable architecture is designed, inspired
to Siamese networks, and trained on a large dataset which
includes images from many different camera models. Once
the training is over, the network is freezed, and can be used
with no further supervision on images captured by any camera
model, both inside and outside the training set. In this way the
approach is completely unsupervised. To any single image the
network associates a noise residual, called noiseprint from now
on, which shows clear traces of camera artifacts. Therefore,
it can be regarded as a camera model fingerprint, much like
the PRNU pattern represents a device fingerprint. It can also
happen that image manipulations leave traces very evident in
the noiseprint, such to allow easy localization even by direct
inspection. As an example, Fig.1 shows two images subject
to a splicing attack, which can be easily detected by visual
inspection of their noiseprints. It is worth to observe that these
artifacts cannot be spotted so clearly using other noise residuals
(see Fig.2).
In the rest of the paper, we first analyze related work on
noise residuals to better contextualize our proposal (Section
II), then describe the proposed architecture and its training
(Section III), carry out a thorough comparative performance
analysis of a noiseprint-based algorithm for forgery localiza-
tion (Section IV), provide ideas and examples on possible
uses of noiseprints for further forensic tasks (Section V), and
eventually draw conclusions (Section VI).
II. RELATED WORK
A. Exploiting noise for image forensics
The observation that the local noise level within an image
may help revealing possible manipulations dates back at least
to 2004, with the work of Popescu and Farid [25]. The under-
lying idea is that each image has an intrinsic uniform amount
of noise introduced by the imaging process or by digital
compression. Therefore, if two images are spliced together,
for example, or some local post-processing is carried out on
part of the image to hide traces of tampering, inconsistencies
in the noise level may occur, which can be used to reveal
the manipulation. In [25] the local noise variance is estimated
over partially overlapping blocks based on the second and
fourth moments of the data, assuming the kurtosis of signal
and noise to be known. Detection of inconsistencies is then
left to visual inspection. In [26] the same approach is adopted,
but the noise variance is estimated through wavelet decompo-
sition and a segmentation process is carried out to check for
homogeneity. In [27], instead, the local noise level is estimated
based on a property of natural images, the projection kurtosis
concentration, and estimation is formulated as an optimization
problem with closed-form solution. Further methods based on
noise level inconsistencies have been recently proposed in [36]
and [37]. A major appeal of all these unsupervised methods is
their generality. They require only a reliable estimator of noise
variance to discover possible anomalies, and need no further
hypotheses and no training. On the down side, since the noise
due to in-camera processing is certainly non-white, using only
intensity as a descriptor neglects precious information.
This consideration justifies the quest for better noise descrip-
tors and the use of machine learning in forensics. One of the
first methods in this class, proposed back in 2005 [38], exploits
statistics extracted from the high-pass wavelet subbands of the
image to train a suitable classifier. In [20], the set of wavelet-
based features of [38] is augmented with prediction error
features computed on a noise residual extracted through de-
noising. A more accurate discrimination is carried out in [21],
[22] by computing both first-order and higher-order Markovian
features on DCT or Wavelet coefficients and also on prediction
errors. Interestingly, these features were inspired by prior work
carried out in steganalysis [39]. This is the same path followed
by the popular rich models, which were proposed originally
in steganalysis [40], and then applied successfully in image
forensics for the detection and localization of various types
3of manipulations [41], [42], [28], [24]. Like in [20] the rich
models rely on noise residuals, but multiple high-pass filters
are used to extract them, and discriminative features are built
based on the co-occurrence of small local patterns. Even
though these methods exhibit a very good performance, they
need a large training set to work properly, a condition rarely
met in the most challenging real-world cases.
To overcome this limitation, the methods proposed in [28]
and [43] exploit rich-model features only to perform unsuper-
vised anomaly detection. In Splicebuster [28] the expectation-
maximization algorithm is used to this end, while [43] resorts
to an ad hoc autoencoder-based architecture. Eventually, these
methods are used for blind forgery detection and localization
with no supervision or external training.
The papers by Swaminathan et al. [44], [45] are concep-
tually related to our noiseprint proposal since they aim at
identifying all the possible traces of in-camera and out-camera
processing, called intrinsic fingerprints. However, the proposed
solution, strongly model-based, is completely different from
ours. The traces of interest are estimated on the basis of a
suitable camera model. Then, any further post-processing is
regarded as a filtering operation whose coefficients can be es-
timated using blind deconvolution. In the end, inconsistencies
in the estimated model parameters suggest that the image has
been manipulated in some way. However, correctly modeling
such processes is quite difficult, and this approach does not
work well in realistic conditions. It is also worth mentioning a
recent paper [46] in which traces of camera model artifacts in
the noise residual are preserved and collected in the so-called
sensor linear pattern, and exploited to find inconsistencies.
B. Using deep learning for image forensics
Recently, deep learning methods have been applied to im-
age forensics. Interestingly, the first proposed architectures,
inspired again by work in steganalysis [47], all focus on
suppressing the scene content, forcing the network to work on
noise residuals. This is obtained by adding a first layer of high-
pass filters, either fixed [48], [49], or trainable [50], or else by
recasting a conventional feature extractor as a convolutional
neural network (CNN) [51]. A two-stream network is proposed
in [52], [53] to exploit both low-level and high-level features,
where a first network constrained to work on noise residuals
is joined with a general purpose deep CNN (ResNet 101 in
[53]). Slightly different CNN-based architectures have been
proposed in [54], [55].
All such solutions, however, rely on a training dataset
strongly aligned with the test set, which limits their value
for real-world problems. Instead, to gain higher robustness,
the training phase should be completely independent of the
test phase. This requirement inspires a group of recently
proposed methods [56], [57], [58] which share some high-
level ideas with our own proposal. In [56] a CNN trained
for camera model identification is used to analyze pairs of
patches: different sources suggest possible image splicing.
Results look promising, but only a synthetic dataset is used
for experiments, and the performance degrades sharply if the
camera models are not present in the training set. A similar
CNN-based
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Fig. 3. Using CNNs to extract noise residuals. Top: the target CNN processes
the input image to generate its noiseprint, a suitable noise residual with
enhanced model-based artifacts. Bottom: the CNN proposed in [59] processes
the input image to generate its AWGN pattern, a strict-sense noise residual.
approach, based on a similarity network, is followed in [57]
for camera model identification. First, the constrained network
of [50] is trained to extract high-level camera model features,
then, another network is trained to learn the similarity between
pairs of such features, with a procedure similar to a Siamese
network. A Siamese network is also used in [58] to predict the
probability that two image patches share the same value for
each EXIF metadata attribute. Once trained, the network can be
used on any possible type of image without supervision. This
is a very important property that we also pursue in our work,
Unlike in [58], however, we do not use metadata information
in the training phase, but rely only on the image content and
on the information about the camera model.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
A digital camera carries out a number of processes to
convert the input light field into the desired output image.
Some of these processes, like data compression, interpolation,
and gamma correction, are common to virtually all cameras,
although with different implementations. Others, included to
offer more advanced functionalities and to attract customers,
vary from model to model. Due to all these internal processing
steps, each camera model leaves on each acquired image a
number of artifacts which are peculiar of the model itself,
and hence can be used to perform forensic analyses. However,
such artifacts are very weak, certainly imperceptible to the eye,
and their exploitation requires sophisticated statistical methods.
To this end, a typical approach consists in extracting a noise
residual of the image, by means of a high-pass filter or a
denoiser.
Our goal is to improve the noise residual extraction process,
enhancing the camera model artifacts to the point of allowing
their direct use for forensic analyses. Accordingly, the product
of our system will be an image-size noise residual, just like in
PRNU-based methods, a noiseprint image that will bear traces
of camera model artifacts, rather than of the individual device
imperfections.
In the following two subsections we describe the noiseprint
extraction process, based on the Siamese network concept, and
provide implementation details on the network training.
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Fig. 4. Training the CNN-based denoiser. To each clean patch yi of the
dataset a synthetic AWGN pattern wi is added to create a noisy patch: xi =
yi +wi. The (xi, wi) pairs are used to train the CNN. The distance between
the residual generated by the CNN, ri = f(xi), and the true noise pattern,
wi, is back-propagated to update the net weights.
A. Extracting noiseprints
Our aim is to design a system, Fig.3(top), which takes a
generic image as input and produces a suitable noise residual
in output, the image noiseprint. As said before, the noiseprint
is desired to contain mostly camera model artifacts. For sure,
we would like to remove from it, or strongly attenuate, the
high-level scene content, which acts as a disturbance for our
purposes. This latter is precisely the goal of the CNN-based
denoiser proposed by Zhang et al. [59]. In fact, rather than
trying to generate the noiseless version of the image, this
denoiser, Fig.3(bottom), aims at extracting the noise pattern
affecting it (by removing the high-level content). Eventually,
this is subtracted from the input to obtain the desired clean
image. For this reason, this denoiser is obviously a good
starting point to develop our own system, so we keep its
architecture, and initialize it with the optimal parameters
obtained in [59] for AWGN image denoising. Then, we will
update such parameters through a suitable training phase.
In [59] these parameters have been obtained by training
the CNN with a large number of paired input-output patches,
where the input is a noisy image patch and the output its noise
content (see Fig.4). We should therefore resume the training
by submitting new paired patches, where the input is a generic
image patch, and the output the corresponding noiseprint. The
only problem is that we have no model of the image noiseprint
therefore we cannot produce the output patches necessary for
this training procedure.
Nonetheless, we have precious information to rely upon.
In fact, we know that image patches coming from the same
camera model should generate similar noiseprint patches, and
image patches coming from different camera models dissimilar
noiseprint patches. Leveraging this knowledge, we can train
the network to generate the desired noise residual where not
only the scene content but all non-discriminative information
is discarded, while discriminative features are enhanced.
Consider the Siamese architecture of Fig.5, formed by the
parallel of two identical CNNs, that is two CNNs which have
both the same architecture and the same weights. Two different
input patches acquired with the same camera model are now
fed to the two branches. Since the outputs are expected to
be similar, the output of net 1 can take the role of desired
output for the input of net 2, and vice-versa, thus providing two
reasonable input-output pairs. For both nets, we can therefore
Residual
Neural Network
1st patch sequence
LOSS
2nd patch sequence
Distance
Residual
Neural Network
Binary
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+1) Patches from the same camera and position
-1) Otherwise
Extracted Residues
Weights
Updating
Fig. 5. Using a Siamese architecture for training. The output of one CNN
takes the role of desired (same model and position) or undesired (different
models or positions) reference for the other twin CNN.
compute the error between the real output and the desired
output, and back-propagate it to update the network weights.
More in general, all pairs formed by the input to one net and
the output to its sibling represent useful training data. For
positive examples (same model) weights are updated so as
to reduce the distance between the outputs, while for negative
examples (different models) weights are updated to increase
this distance. It is worth emphasizing that negative examples
are no less important than positive ones. Indeed, they teach
the network to discard irrelevant information, common to all
models, and keep in the noiseprint only the most discriminative
features.
Until now, for the sake of simplicity, we have neglected
the following important point. In order for two input patches
to merit a positive label, they must come not only from the
same camera model but also from the same position in the
image. In fact, artifacts generated by in-camera processes are
not spatially stationary, just think of JPEG compression with its
regular 8×8 grid, or to the regular sampling pattern used for ac-
quiring the three color channels. Therefore, noiseprint patches
corresponding to different positions are different themselves
(unless the displacement is a multiple of all artifacts’ periods),
and input patches drawn from different positions must not be
pooled during training, in order not to dilute the artifacts’
strength. An important consequence for forensic analyses is
that any image shift, not to talk of rotation, will impact on the
corresponding noiseprint, thereby allowing for the detection of
many types of manipulations.
When the training process ends, the system is freezed.
Consequently, to each input image a noiseprint is determinis-
tically associated, which enhances the camera model artifacts
with their model-dependent spatial distribution. Of course, the
noiseprint will also contain random disturbances, including
traces of the high-level scene. Nonetheless, the enhanced
artifacts appear to be much stronger than these disturbances,
and such to provide a satisfactory basis for forensic tasks.
B. Implementation
In the previous subsection our aim was to convey the main
ideas about the nature of noiseprints and how to extract them.
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Fig. 6. Detailed architecture of the CNN-based denoiser.
Here we provide crucial implementation details, which allow
a fast and accurate training of the system.
1) Initialization: As already said, we start from the archi-
tecture of the denoiser proposed in [59], shown in some more
detail in Fig.6. Like in [59], for complexity issues, the network
is trained using minibatches of N patches of K ×K pixels,
with N=200 and K=48. It is worth underlining, however, that
the system is fully convolutional and hence, once trained, it
works on input images of any given size, not just 48×48
patches. Therefore, there is no patch stitching issue.
2) Boosting minibatch information: Concerning training, it
should be realized that the Siamese architecture is only an
abstraction, useful to understand how input-output pairs are
generated. In practice, there is only one CNN, which must
be trained by submitting a large number of examples. Each
minibatch, as said before, includes N=200 patches, which are
used to form suitable input-output pairs. However, this does
not imply that only N/2 pairs can be formed: in fact, each
individual patch can be meaningfully combined with all the
others, as proposed in [17], lifting a batch of examples into a
dense pairwise matrix. When two patches come from the same
model and image position, the pair will have a positive label,
otherwise a negative label. Therefore, each minibatch provides
O(N2) examples rather than just O(N), with a significant
speed-up of training. In particular, to implement this strategy,
our minibatches comprise 50 groups of 4 patches. Each group
is internally homogeneous (same model same position) but
heterogeneous with respect to the other groups.
3) Distance-based logistic loss: As for the loss function,
L, we adopt the distance based logistic (DBL) proposed in
[18]. Let {x1, . . . ,xn} be a minibatch of input patches, and
{r1, . . . , rn} the corresponding residuals output by the net.
Then, let dij = ‖ri − rj‖2 be the squared Euclidean distance
between residuals i and j. We require such distances to
be small when (i, j) belong to the same group, and large
otherwise. Now, for the generic i-th patch, we can build a
suitable probability distribution through softmax processing as
pi(j) =
e−dij∑
j 6=i e−dij
(1)
With this definition, our original requirement on distances is
converted in the requirement that pi(j) be large whenever (i, j)
are in the same group, that is, lij = +1, and small otherwise.
This leads us to define the i-th patch loss as
Li = − log
∑
j:lij=+1
pi(j) (2)
When all the probability mass is concentrated in same-group
patches, the sum is unitary and the loss is null, while all
deviations from this condition cause an increase of the loss.
Accordingly, the minibatch loss is defined as the sum of all
per-patch losses, hence
L0 =
∑
i
− log ∑
j:lij=+1
pi(j)
 (3)
4) Regularization: To encourage diversity of noiseprints, we
add a regularization term to the previous DBL loss. Let
Ri(u, v) = F(ri(m,n)) (4)
be the 2D discrete Fourier transform of patch ri, where (m,n)
and (u, v) indicate spatial and spectral discrete coordinates,
respectively. The quantity
S(u, v) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Ri(u, v)|2 (5)
is therefore an estimate of the power spectral density (PSD)
of the whole minibatch. For a given camera model, the power
spectrum will peak at the fundamental frequencies of artifacts
and their combinations. It is expected, however, that different
camera models will have different spectral peaks. Actually,
since the locations of such peaks are powerful discriminative
features, it is desirable that they be uniformly distributed over
all frequencies. To this end, we include in the loss function a
regularization term given by the log-ratio between geometric
and arithmetic means of the PSD components
R = log
[
SGM
SAM
]
(6)
=
[
1
K2
∑
u,v
logS(u, v)
]
− log
[
1
K2
∑
u,v
S(u, v)
]
In fact, the GM/AM ratio is maximized for uniform dis-
tribution, and therefore its inclusion encourages the maxi-
mum spread of frequency-related features across the model
noiseprints. Eventually, the complete loss function reads as
L = L0 − λR (7)
with the weight λ to be determined by experiments.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We now provide some experimental evidence on the poten-
tial of noiseprints for forensic analyses. Camera fingerprints
can be used for a multiplicity of goals, as proven by the large
body of literature on the applications of PRNU patterns. In
Section V we provide some insights into the possible uses of
noiseprints. However, we leave a detailed investigation of all
these cases for future work, and focus, instead, on just one
major forensic task, the localization of image manipulations,
irrespective of their nature. To analyze performance in depth,
we carry out an extensive experimental analysis, considering
9 datasets of very different characteristics, and comparing
6TABLE I. REFERENCE METHODS.
Acronym Ref. Software Code
BLK [60] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
DCT [61] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
ADQ1 [62] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
ADQ2 [63] http://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/sites/default/files/Documenti
NADQ [16] http://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/sites/default/files/Documenti
CAGI [64] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
CFA1 [14] http://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/sites/default/files/Documenti
CFA2 [13] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
ELA [65] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
NOI1 [26] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
NOI4 [66] https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
NOI2 [27] our implementation
Splicebuster [28] http://www.grip.unina.it/research/83-image-forensics
EXIF-SC [58] https://github.com/minyoungg/selfconsistency
results, under several performance criteria, with all the most
promising reference techniques. In the rest of this Section,
we first present our noiseprint-based localization method, then
describe the reference methods, the datasets, and the perfor-
mance metrics, provide details on the training of the noiseprint
extractor, and finally present and discuss experimental results.
A. Forgery localization based on noiseprints
In the presence of localized image manipulations, the image
noiseprint shows often clear traces of the attack, allowing
direct visual detection and localization. However, this is not
always the case, and an automatic localization tool is necessary
to support the analyst’s work. In particular, we look for a
localization algorithm which takes the image and its noiseprint
as input, and outputs a real-valued heatmap which, for each
pixel, provides information on the likelihood that it has has
been manipulated.
Here, we use the very same blind localization algorithm
proposed for Splicebuster [28]. By so doing, we obtain an
objective measure of the improvement granted by adopting
the image noiseprint in place of the third-order image residual
used in [28]. The algorithm assumes that the pristine and
manipulated parts of the image are characterized by different
models. Accordingly, it looks for anomalies w.r.t. the dominant
pristine model to locate the manipulated part. To each pixel of a
regular sampling grid, a feature vector is associated, accounting
for the spatial co-occurrences of residuals. These vectors are
then fed to the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm,
which learns the two models together with the corresponding
segmentation map. The interested reader is referred to [28] for
a more detailed description. However, it is worth emphasizing
the blind nature of this localization algorithm, which relies
only on the given image with no need of prior information.
B. Reference methods
We consider only reference methods which are blind, like
our proposal, that is, they do not need specific datasets for
TABLE II. DATASETS.
dataset # img. # cam. size (MB) format
DSO-1 100 unkn. 3.00 PNG
VIPP 62 9+ 0.08 ÷ 17.08 JPEG@[70-100]
Korus 220 4 1.98 TIFF
FaceSwap 879 327+ 0.20 ÷ 34.47 JPEG@95
NIMBLE16 282 45 0.24 ÷ 20.05 JPEG@[75,99]
NIMBLE17-dev2 353 75+ 0.11 ÷ 40.22 233 JPEG@[50-100], 12 raw
NIMBLE17-eval 411 119+ 0.05 ÷ 40.42 407 JPEG@[49-100], 4 raw
MFC18-dev1 3886 60+ 0.05 ÷ 23.04 2943 JPEG@[53-100], 943 raw
MFC18-eval 2331 100+ 0.02 ÷ 40.22 1805 JPEG@[50-100], 526 raw
training or fine tuning, nor do they use metadata or other
prior information on the test data. Besides being more general,
these methods are less sensitive to dataset-related polarizations,
allowing a fair comparison. Most of these methods can be
considered state-of-the-art in the field, except for a few ones,
like the error level analysis (ELA) included for their diffusion
among practitioners. They can be roughly classified in three
classes according to the features they exploit: i) JPEG artifacts
[60], [61], [62], [63], [16], [64], ii) CFA artifacts [14], [13], iii)
inconsistencies in the spatial distribution of features [65], [26],
[66], [27], [28], [58]. Tab.I lists all methods under comparison
together with a link to the available source or executable
code. To save space, we use compact acronyms, for example
EXIF-SC to mean EXIF self-consistency algorithm [58]. Our
own proposed noiseprint-based localization algorithm will be
referred to simply as Noiseprint from now on.
C. Datasets
To assess performance we use 9 datasets, which are listed
in Tab.II together with their main features. Some of them
focus only on splicing, like the DSO-1 dataset [5], the VIPP
dataset [16], created to evaluate double JPEG compression
artifacts, and the FaceSwap dataset [52], where only automatic
face manipulation have been created using code available on-
line1. All other datasets, instead, present a wide variety of
manipulations, sometimes cascaded on one another on the
same image.
They also present very different characteristics in terms of
number of cameras, resolution and format. For example, the
dataset proposed by Korus et al. [67] comprises only raw
images of the same resolution, acquired by only four different
cameras. This low variability can induce some polarizations of
the results. On the contrary, the NIMBLE2 and MFC3 datasets
designed by NIST for algorithm development and evaluation
in the context of the Medifor program, are extremely variable,
beyond what can be found in real practice. Therefore, they can
be considered very challenging benchmarks for all methods
under test.
1https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
2https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/nimble-challenge-2017-evaluation
3https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/media-forensics-challenge-2018
7D. Performance measures
Forgery localization can be regarded as a binary classifi-
cation problem. Pixels belong to one of two classes, pristine
(background or negative) or forged (foreground or positive),
and a decision must be made for each of them. All performance
metrics rely on four basic quantities
• TP (true positive): # positive pixels declared positive;
• TN (true negative): # negative pixels declared negative;
• FP (false positive): # negative pixels declared positive;
• FN (false negative): # positive pixels declared negative;
Since the last two items correspond to errors, a natural perfor-
mance measure is the overall accuracy
A =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(8)
However, often there are many more negative than positive
pixels, and errors on positive pixels impact very little on
accuracy, which becomes a poor indicator of performance.
This is exactly the case of forgery localization, where the
manipulated area is often much smaller than the background.
To address this problem a number of other metrics have
been proposed. Precision and recall, defined as
precision =
TP
TP + FP
recall =
TP
TP + FN
put emphasis on the positive (forged) class, measuring, respec-
tively, the method’s ability to avoid false alarms and detect
forged pixels. These quantities are summarized in a single
index by their harmonic mean, the F1 measure
F1 =
2
1
precision +
1
recall
=
2TP
2TP + FN + FP
Another popular metric is the Matthews Correlation Coefficient
(MCC), that is, the cross correlation coefficient between the
decision map and and the ground truth, computed as
MCC =
TP × TN − FP × FN√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
which is robust to unbalanced classes.
Both F1 and MCC work on a binary decision map. However,
most methods provide a continuous-valued heatmap, which
is converted to a binary map by thresholding. Therefore,
to free performance assessment from the threshold selection
problem, for both F1 and MCC the maximum over all possible
thresholds is taken. An alternative approach is followed with
the Average Precision (AP) which is computed as the area
under the precision-recall curve, and therefore can be regarded
as an average of performance measures over all thresholds.
In order to carry out a solid assessment of performance, we
consider all three measures, F1, MCC, and AP.
Note that, in some cases, the output heatmap may have an
inverted polarity w.r.t. the ground truth (see Fig.7). Since this
is immaterial for the semantics of the map, but may disrupt
performance, we always consider both the original and inverted
heatmaps, and keep the best of the two. Finally, we exclude
from the evaluation pixels near the foreground-background
boundary, where all methods are very unreliable due to limited
resolution.
Fig. 7. From left to right: forged images, ground truth, heatmaps from the
method proposed in [64] and in [26]. The forged area can be dark or light, this
does not really matter, since the approaches look for image inconsistencies.
E. Training procedure
For the proposed method the network used to extract all
noiseprints is trained on a large variety of models. To this
end, we formed a large dataset, including both cameras and
smartphones, using various publicly available datasets, plus
some other private cameras. In detail, we used
• 44 cameras from the Dresden dataset [68],
• 32 from Socrates dataset [69],
• 32 from VISION [70],
• 17 from our private dataset,
totaling 125 individual cameras from 70 different models and
19 brands. For the experiments, this dataset is split, on a
per-camera basis, in training and validation sets, comprising
100 and 25 cameras, respectively. We note explicitly that the
datasets used to form the training and validation sets are not
used in the test phase. All images are originally in JPEG
format.
The network is initialized with the weights of the denoising
network of [59]. During training, each minibatch contains 200
patches of 48×48 pixels extracted from 100 different images
of 25 different cameras. In each batch, there are 50 sets, each
one formed by 4 patches with same camera and position.
Training is performed using the ADAM optimizer. All hyper-
parameters (learning rate, number of iterations, and weight of
regularization term) are chosen using the validation set.
Considering the major impact of JPEG compression on
performance, we use a different network for each JPEG
quality factor, training it on images that are preliminary JPEG
compressed with the same factor. To ensure reproducibility of
results, all trained nets will be made available on-line upon
publication of this manuscript.
F. Results
We now present and discuss experimental results for all 9
datasets, 15 methods under comparison, and 3 performance
metrics. Our choice is to consider one metric at a time, in
order to allow a synoptic view of the performance of all
methods over all datasets. Under this respect, it is worth
noting in advance that, although numbers change significantly
from one metric to another, the relative ranking of methods
remains pretty much the same. Therefore, in the tables III-V
we report results in terms of MCC, F1 and AP, respectively. We
complement each performance value with the corresponding
8TABLE III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: MCC (MATTHEWS CORRELATION COEFFICIENT)
Dataset DSO-1 VIPP Korus FaceSwap Nim.16 Nim.17dev2 Nim.17eval MFC18dev1 MFC18eval AVERAGE
ELA 0.149 (14) 0.190 (12) 0.087 (13) 0.087 (11) 0.145 (14) 0.103 (14) 0.112 (14) 0.110 (13) 0.115 (14) 0.122 (13.2)
BLK 0.388 ( 7) 0.365 ( 8) 0.148 (11) 0.118 (10) 0.204 ( 9) 0.163 (10) 0.156 ( 9) 0.167 ( 9) 0.153 (11) 0.207 ( 9.3)
DCT 0.234 (10) 0.376 ( 7) 0.118 (12) 0.194 ( 8) 0.195 (10) 0.154 (12) 0.151 (10) 0.153 (10) 0.159 (10) 0.193 ( 9.9)
NADQ 0.065 (15) 0.162 (14) 0.046 (15) 0.040 (15) 0.154 (13) 0.103 (15) 0.113 (13) 0.104 (14) 0.123 (13) 0.101 (14.1)
ADQ1 0.321 ( 9) 0.473 ( 3) 0.170 (10) 0.311 ( 4) 0.262 ( 7) 0.181 ( 8) 0.193 ( 7) 0.203 ( 8) 0.194 ( 8) 0.256 ( 7.1)
ADQ2 0.464 ( 6) 0.557 ( 1) 0.205 ( 9) 0.463 ( 1) 0.305 ( 4) 0.205 ( 7) 0.190 ( 8) 0.299 ( 3) 0.237 ( 4) 0.325 ( 4.8)
CAGI 0.488 ( 4) 0.429 ( 4) 0.231 ( 6) 0.205 ( 7) 0.279 ( 6) 0.242 ( 4) 0.258 ( 4) 0.232 ( 6) 0.215 ( 5) 0.286 ( 5.1)
CFA1 0.179 (11) 0.225 (11) 0.453 ( 1) 0.072 (12) 0.185 (11) 0.175 ( 9) 0.148 (11) 0.140 (11) 0.164 ( 9) 0.193 ( 9.6)
CFA2 0.168 (12) 0.167 (13) 0.263 ( 5) 0.071 (13) 0.184 (12) 0.160 (11) 0.132 (12) 0.136 (12) 0.153 (12) 0.159 (11.3)
NOI1 0.332 ( 8) 0.276 (10) 0.223 ( 7) 0.145 ( 9) 0.235 ( 8) 0.226 ( 5) 0.214 ( 5) 0.215 ( 7) 0.212 ( 7) 0.231 ( 7.3)
NOI4 0.160 (13) 0.160 (15) 0.081 (14) 0.052 (14) 0.133 (15) 0.112 (13) 0.111 (15) 0.104 (15) 0.104 (15) 0.113 (14.3)
NOI2 0.487 ( 5) 0.339 ( 9) 0.218 ( 8) 0.221 ( 6) 0.296 ( 5) 0.218 ( 6) 0.199 ( 6) 0.251 ( 5) 0.213 ( 6) 0.271 ( 6.2)
EXIF-SC 0.529 ( 3) 0.402 ( 5) 0.278 ( 4) 0.306 ( 5) 0.344 ( 2) 0.320 ( 3) 0.297 ( 1) 0.261 ( 4) 0.260 ( 3) 0.333 ( 3.3)
Splicebuster 0.615 ( 2) 0.391 ( 6) 0.391 ( 2) 0.350 ( 3) 0.344 ( 3) 0.328 ( 1) 0.280 ( 3) 0.305 ( 2) 0.281 ( 2) 0.365 ( 2.7)
Noiseprint 0.758 ( 1) 0.532 ( 2) 0.345 ( 3) 0.356 ( 2) 0.387 ( 1) 0.324 ( 2) 0.295 ( 2) 0.334 ( 1) 0.292 ( 1) 0.403 ( 1.7)
rank on the dataset, in parentheses, using red for the three
best methods, blue for the others. The last two columns show
the average performance and average ranking over all datasets.
We begin our analysis from these latter quantities which
allow for a first large-scale assessment. The proposed
noiseprint-based method provides the best average perfor-
mance, MCC=0.403, which is 10% better than the second
best (Splicebuster) and much better than all the others, which
go from 0.101 to 0.333. This is the effect of a uniformly
good performance over all datasets. Noiseprint ranks always
among the best three methods (red), with an average rank
of 1.7, testifying of a remarkable robustness across datasets
with wildly different characteristics. The comparison with
Splicebuster (average MCC=0.365, average ranking=2.7) is
especially meaningful, since the two methods differ only in
the input noise residual, obtained thorough high-pass filtering
in Splicebuster and given by noiseprint here. It is also worth
noting that the third best technique, based on EXIF metadata
inconsistencies, looks for similarity among patches and uses
a deep CNN with intensive training (not influenced by the
test set), further supporting the soundness of the proposed
approach.
Some specific cases deserve a deeper analysis. On the Korus
dataset, for example, Noiseprint ranks only third, after CFA1
and Splicebuster. However, this is a dataset of raw images
(not JPEG compressed) while Noiseprint is trained on JPEG-
compressed images. On this dataset, CFA-based methods per-
form especially well, since two of the four cameras (the two
Nikon) fit very well the model developed in [14]. All this
said, Noiseprint keeps providing a good performance, while
methods based on JPEG artifacts show a dramatic impairment.
Conversely, on the VIPP dataset, JPEG-based methods exhibit
a boost in performance, especially ADQ1 and ADQ2 which
look for double JPEG compression artifacts. Indeed, the VIPP
dataset was built originally to expose this very type of artifacts.
In this case as well, Noiseprint ranks among the best methods.
These examples ring an alarm bell on the use of polarized
dataset. In fact, these are precious tools to study a specific
phenomenon but cannot be taken as reliable predictors of
performance in uncontrolled scenarios. For this latter task,
datasets should be much more varied and, even better, multiple
independent datasets should be considered at once.
The NIMBLE and MFC datasets, developed by NIST under
the Medifor program, fit very well this latter profile. They are
characterized by a large variety of attacks (e.g., splicing, copy-
move, removal through inpainting, local blurring, contrast en-
hancement) often cascaded on the same image. Therefore, they
represent very challenging testbeds, especially for robustness.
In fact, all methods exhibit a worse average performance on
these datasets than on the first four. Noteworthy, Noiseprint
ranks always first or second on these datasets and, when
second, just inches away from the best (0.324 vs. 0328, or
0.295 vs. 0.297). Since also Splicebuster and EXIF-SC perform
quite well, it seems safe to say that the spatial inconsistency
of features is the key for good results. A relatively good
performance is also ensured by ADQ2, CAGI, and NOI2.
Tab.IV and Tab.V report experimental results for the F1
and AP metrics, with the same structure as Tab.III. We will
keep comments to a minimum here, since the numbers, and
especially the relative ranking, change very little by replacing
one metric with another. The most remarkable variation is a
slight improvement in the ranking of EXIF-SC on the AP
metric, which is now the same as Splicebuster on the average.
Noiseprint keeps providing the best average performance, with
a remarkable stability across all datasets. Readers familiar
with the F1 measure may notice the impressive 0.78 obtained
on DSO-1, but this is a simple dataset, with large splicings
and uncompressed images. Still, this shows that in favourable
conditions, near-perfect localization is possible.
A better insight on the actual quality of results can be
gathered by the visual inspection of the examples of Fig.8.
Note that these examples were cherry-picked from all datasets
to show cases where Noiseprint provides a good results even
when most of the best competitor fail. It is worth noting that
9TABLE IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: F1 (F-MEASURE)
Dataset DSO-1 VIPP Korus FaceSwap Nim.16 Nim.17dev2 Nim.17eval MFC18dev1 MFC18eval AVERAGE
ELA 0.285 (14) 0.265 (12) 0.129 (13) 0.079 (11) 0.184 (14) 0.274 (13) 0.257 (14) 0.231 (13) 0.255 (13) 0.218 (13.0)
BLK 0.449 ( 7) 0.411 ( 8) 0.169 (10) 0.097 (10) 0.233 (10) 0.306 ( 9) 0.280 (10) 0.264 ( 9) 0.275 (11) 0.276 ( 9.3)
DCT 0.350 (10) 0.416 ( 7) 0.151 (12) 0.182 ( 7) 0.234 ( 9) 0.296 (12) 0.283 ( 9) 0.253 (10) 0.276 (10) 0.271 ( 9.6)
NADQ 0.247 (15) 0.248 (13) 0.104 (15) 0.037 (15) 0.208 (13) 0.267 (15) 0.261 (13) 0.219 (15) 0.251 (14) 0.205 (14.2)
ADQ1 0.411 ( 9) 0.498 ( 3) 0.166 (11) 0.282 ( 4) 0.275 ( 7) 0.304 (10) 0.292 ( 8) 0.287 ( 8) 0.297 ( 8) 0.312 ( 7.6)
ADQ2 0.530 ( 6) 0.572 ( 1) 0.185 ( 9) 0.426 ( 1) 0.317 ( 4) 0.329 ( 7) 0.302 ( 7) 0.383 ( 2) 0.344 ( 4) 0.376 ( 4.6)
CAGI 0.537 ( 4) 0.460 ( 4) 0.229 ( 7) 0.172 ( 8) 0.296 ( 6) 0.361 ( 4) 0.356 ( 4) 0.315 ( 6) 0.316 ( 6) 0.338 ( 5.4)
CFA1 0.306 (11) 0.281 (11) 0.452 ( 1) 0.057 (13) 0.225 (12) 0.313 ( 8) 0.280 (11) 0.242 (11) 0.280 ( 9) 0.271 ( 9.7)
CFA2 0.293 (12) 0.240 (14) 0.274 ( 4) 0.060 (12) 0.227 (11) 0.303 (11) 0.269 (12) 0.237 (12) 0.272 (12) 0.242 (11.1)
NOI1 0.412 ( 8) 0.317 (10) 0.235 ( 6) 0.122 ( 9) 0.260 ( 8) 0.336 ( 6) 0.317 ( 5) 0.293 ( 7) 0.305 ( 7) 0.288 ( 7.3)
NOI4 0.291 (13) 0.240 (15) 0.120 (14) 0.046 (14) 0.175 (15) 0.274 (14) 0.257 (15) 0.228 (14) 0.249 (15) 0.209 (14.3)
NOI2 0.532 ( 5) 0.373 ( 9) 0.224 ( 8) 0.190 ( 6) 0.314 ( 5) 0.344 ( 5) 0.314 ( 6) 0.336 ( 5) 0.319 ( 5) 0.327 ( 6.0)
EXIF-SC 0.576 ( 3) 0.423 ( 6) 0.274 ( 5) 0.266 ( 5) 0.358 ( 3) 0.426 ( 3) 0.384 ( 1) 0.337 ( 4) 0.355 ( 3) 0.378 ( 3.7)
Splicebuster 0.660 ( 2) 0.432 ( 5) 0.384 ( 2) 0.303 ( 3) 0.359 ( 2) 0.441 ( 1) 0.372 ( 3) 0.380 ( 3) 0.365 ( 2) 0.411 ( 2.6)
Noiseprint 0.780 ( 1) 0.549 ( 2) 0.350 ( 3) 0.322 ( 2) 0.395 ( 1) 0.435 ( 2) 0.380 ( 2) 0.404 ( 1) 0.380 ( 1) 0.444 ( 1.7)
TABLE V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: AP (AVERAGE PRECISION)
Dataset DSO-1 VIPP Korus FaceSwap Nim.16 Nim.17dev2 Nim.17eval MFC18dev1 MFC18eval AVERAGE
ELA 0.190 (13) 0.169 (13) 0.075 (11) 0.044 (11) 0.101 (14) 0.224 (13) 0.203 (14) 0.176 (14) 0.205 (14) 0.154 (13.0)
BLK 0.326 ( 8) 0.354 ( 7) 0.104 ( 9) 0.060 (10) 0.169 (10) 0.265 ( 7) 0.224 ( 9) 0.212 ( 9) 0.230 (11) 0.216 ( 8.9)
DCT 0.283 (10) 0.379 ( 5) 0.101 (10) 0.168 ( 6) 0.164 (12) 0.256 (10) 0.233 ( 7) 0.206 (10) 0.236 ( 9) 0.225 ( 8.8)
NADQ 0.162 (15) 0.179 (12) 0.062 (13) 0.019 (14) 0.165 (11) 0.231 (12) 0.219 (11) 0.178 (13) 0.217 (13) 0.159 (12.7)
ADQ1 0.324 ( 9) 0.488 ( 2) 0.069 (12) 0.257 ( 5) 0.161 (13) 0.216 (15) 0.205 (13) 0.222 ( 8) 0.234 (10) 0.242 ( 9.7)
ADQ2 0.415 ( 6) 0.549 ( 1) 0.048 (15) 0.425 ( 1) 0.202 ( 7) 0.245 (11) 0.213 (12) 0.316 ( 3) 0.279 ( 5) 0.299 ( 6.8)
CAGI 0.503 ( 4) 0.409 ( 4) 0.162 ( 7) 0.154 ( 7) 0.252 ( 5) 0.326 ( 4) 0.320 ( 4) 0.275 ( 6) 0.286 ( 4) 0.299 ( 5.0)
CFA1 0.240 (11) 0.188 (11) 0.408 ( 1) 0.026 (13) 0.170 ( 8) 0.263 ( 8) 0.232 ( 8) 0.192 (12) 0.240 ( 8) 0.218 ( 8.9)
CFA2 0.207 (12) 0.164 (14) 0.196 ( 5) 0.027 (12) 0.170 ( 9) 0.260 ( 9) 0.223 (10) 0.193 (11) 0.230 (12) 0.185 (10.4)
NOI1 0.339 ( 7) 0.226 (10) 0.177 ( 6) 0.085 ( 9) 0.205 ( 6) 0.293 ( 6) 0.272 ( 5) 0.248 ( 7) 0.269 ( 7) 0.235 ( 7.0)
NOI4 0.189 (14) 0.142 (15) 0.062 (14) 0.017 (15) 0.094 (15) 0.221 (14) 0.198 (15) 0.173 (15) 0.198 (15) 0.144 (14.7)
NOI2 0.480 ( 5) 0.280 ( 9) 0.152 ( 8) 0.134 ( 8) 0.258 ( 4) 0.297 ( 5) 0.258 ( 6) 0.278 ( 5) 0.279 ( 6) 0.268 ( 6.2)
EXIF-SC 0.532 ( 3) 0.357 ( 6) 0.214 ( 4) 0.272 ( 4) 0.338 ( 1) 0.415 ( 2) 0.362 ( 1) 0.312 ( 4) 0.337 ( 2) 0.349 ( 3.0)
Splicebuster 0.612 ( 2) 0.351 ( 8) 0.332 ( 2) 0.291 ( 3) 0.308 ( 3) 0.416 ( 1) 0.342 ( 3) 0.334 ( 2) 0.333 ( 3) 0.369 ( 3.0)
Noiseprint 0.728 ( 1) 0.480 ( 3) 0.288 ( 3) 0.311 ( 2) 0.332 ( 2) 0.396 ( 3) 0.347 ( 2) 0.364 ( 1) 0.344 ( 1) 0.399 ( 2.0)
the correct localization in these examples comes together with
an accurate delineation of contours and rare false alarms. This
is not always the case, of course, as is shown in Fig.9. In
general, errors are due to the leakage of high-level content
into the noiseprint. This happens especially in the presence of
strongly textured areas, since the leaked regular patterns, with
almost periodic structures, are misinterpreted as traces of an
alien noiseprint. A further critical case is given by very small
images, with data too scarce to allow correct interpretation.
Finally, global image processing, like compression, resizing,
and blurring, tend to reduce the noiseprint strength and hence
impair the performance of subsequent steps.
V. FURTHER NOISEPRINT-BASED FORENSIC ANALYSES
The main goal of this work was to present the noiseprint idea
and its implementation. Forgery localization was selected to
prove the potential of this approach on a well-studied forensic
problem, where plenty of reference methods and datasets are
available. It should be clear, however, that a strong camera
model fingerprint can be used for many other applications in
the forensic field. This Section is meant to highlight some
possible applications, something more than a “future work” list
but less than a set of functioning and well studied algorithms.
A first obvious application is camera model identification.
So, we carried out a very basic source identification ex-
periment, comparing the conventional PRNU-based method
of [30] with the corresponding noiseprint-based method. We
used 3 different camera models (Nikon D70, Nikon D200
and Smartphone OnePlus) with 2 devices per camera. Only
the central 128×128-pixel crop of test images was used for
identification. For each device, 100 training images were
used to estimate the ideal PRNU/noiseprint reference pattern
by sample averaging. Then, each image was attributed to
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Fig. 8. Examples from all the test datasets. From left to right: forged image, ground truth, heatmaps from the six best performing methods: ADQ2, CAGI,
NOI2, EXIF-SC, Splicebuster, Noiseprint. Note that some heatmaps are color-inverted, for example, the NOI2 map for the Nim.16 image.
Fig. 9. Noiseprint failure examples. Top: original image, middle: ground
truth, bottom: heatmap. Problems are mostly due to strongly textured regions,
whose leaks in the noise residual are interpreted as an alien noiseprint.
the device whose reference pattern had minimum Euclidean
distance w.r.t. the noise residual. Tab.VI shows the confusion
matrices obtained in the two cases.
In terms of model identification, the noiseprint-based
method provides 100% accuracy, to be compared with the
77% accuracy ensured by PRNU. Of course, PRNU allows
one to perform also device identification, with 70% accuracy.
Interestingly, for this latter task noiseprint provides a 62%
accuracy, that is, the choice between the two devices of the
same model is not entirely random, a fact that deserves further
investigation.
Let us now move to some unconventional attacks. In Fig.10
we show, on the left, some images subject to seam carving
[71], horizontal, vertical, or both, and, on the right, the
corresponding noiseprint heatmaps obtained as described in
Section IV.A. In the heatmaps, traces of the inserted seams
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TABLE VI. CONFUSION MATRICES FOR CAMERA IDENTIFICATION
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
A1 27 7 5 5 3 3
A2 7 25 2 6 3 7
B1 0 2 46 0 0 2
B2 1 0 1 46 1 1
C1 3 3 5 6 29 4
C2 5 0 3 2 4 36
PRNU
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
A1 33 17 0 0 0 0
A2 37 13 0 0 0 0
B1 0 0 31 19 0 0
B2 0 0 14 36 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 32 18
C2 0 0 0 0 10 40
Noiseprint
Seam-carved images Noiseprint heatmaps
Fig. 10. Seam-carved images (left part) and corresponding noiseprint
heatmaps (right part). Top-left: original image; diagonal: vertical/horizontal
seam carving; bottom-right: vertical and horizontal seam carving.
are clearly visible, allowing easy detection of the attack by a
human observer.
Image inpainting has seen huge progresses with the advent
of deep learning. A recently proposed [72] method based
on generative adversarial networks has proven to produce
results with a remarkably natural appearance in the presence
of quite complex scenes. In Fig.11 we show two such ex-
amples, together with the noiseprints extracted from inpainted
images. A visual inspection of the noiseprints (with suitable
zoom) reveals a clear textural change in correspondence of the
inpainted area. Converting such information into an automatic
algorithm for inpainting detection should be at hand.
We conclude this short review going back to image splicing.
In this case, however, the target images shown in Fig.12, were
acquired by sensors mounted on board a satellite, which has
quite different characteristics w.r.t. common camera sensors,
and its peculiar processing chain. Nonetheless, the associated
noiseprints reveal quite clearly the manipulations, which are
captured with great accuracy in the heatmaps.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a deep learning method to
extract a noise residual, called noiseprint, where the scene
content is largely suppressed and model-related artifacts are
enhanced. Therefore, a noiseprint bears traces of the ideal
camera model fingerprint much like a PRNU residual bears
traces of the ideal device fingerprint. In noiseprints, however,
the signal of interest is much stronger than in PRNU residuals,
allowing for the reliable accomplishment of many forensic
tasks. Experiments on forgery localization provide support to
this statement, but many more forensic applications can be
envisioned, which certainly deserve thorough investigation.
Original Image Ground Truth Noiseprint
Fig. 11. Noiseprints of images inpainted by an advanced GAN-based method.
Image Ground Truth Noiseprint Heatmap
Fig. 12. In first line, there is a image of Washington by WorldView2 satel-
lite (https://www.digitalglobe.com/resources/product-samples/washington-dc-
usa). In the second line a image of Caserta by Ikonos satellite.
Despite the promising results, one must keep in mind that
no tool can solve all forensic tasks by itself. As an example,
noiseprints will probably allow excellent camera model iden-
tification, but cannot help for device identification. Therefore,
the fusion of noiseprint-based tools with other approaches is
a further topic of interest for future research.
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